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Admissibility of Plea Agreements
on Direct Examination-
Are There Any Limits?
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1980's, with the advent of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, plea agreements have become commonplace in American
criminal jurisprudence, particularly in multiple defendant or conspiracy
cases. For example, in 1999, out of the 21,840 arrests for drug traffick-
ing, 20,481, almost ninety-four percent, of those cases were disposed of
through a plea agreement, as opposed to trial.' The use of plea bargains
in trials from the 1970's to today has been an example of the common
law at work. Plea bargains have evolved from an added twist in criminal
trials to an expected tool in the prosecutor's toolbox. Early tensions
between improper bolstering of beneficiary witnesses and anticipatory
disclosure of evidence by the prosecution have largely yielded to almost
blanket admission of all facets of a plea agreement. Provided the "rit-
ual" of admitting the agreement in conjunction with a testifying witness
is adhered to, defense lawyers have nary a prayer to preclude its admis-
sion against their clients.
Plea agreements are a contract between a defendant and the prose-
cuting attorney in which a defendant will plead "guilty" or "no contest"
to a charge in exchange for something in return from the prosecutor.2
Typically, consideration from a prosecutor in these agreements would
consist of charging the accused with a lesser included offense or fewer
number of charges, or recommending, or not opposing, a certain range
within the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Additionally, other matters
may be dealt with in a plea bargain, such as the defendant agreeing to
testify in another trial, perhaps against a co-conspirator, or provide infor-
mation in an ongoing investigation.
This Comment examines plea agreements, and by analogy immu-
nity agreements, in federal appellate jurisprudence since the late 1970's,
I. United States Sentencing Commission, Statistics for the Eleventh Circuit, Fiscal Year
1999, Table 3, available at http://www.ussc.gov/judpack/1999/1 lc99.pdf. (last visited Oct. 22,
2001).
2. Department of Justice, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, 1 9-16.000 et seq.,
available at http://www.doj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/ [hereinafter
"USAM"]; see also UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, TITLE 9, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S
CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/
usam/title9 [hereinafter "USACRM"].
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the current understanding of their uses and limits, and offers thoughts
about their future applications. The Comment focuses on the major
cases in the federal circuit courts of appeals defining the state of the law
with regard to plea and immunity agreements. Some state cases are also
noted to highlight the use of plea agreements in other jurisdictions.3 To
contribute to the theme of this Symposium, issues United States Attor-
neys consider in determining whether to enter into a plea agreement are
briefly described in Part II. Part III expands upon the purposes served
by plea agreements, both proper and improper, to include discussion of
potential pitfalls prosecutors should avoid (and for which defense attor-
neys should be aware) when using or impeaching witness testimony pur-
suant to a plea agreement. Admissibility issues will be discussed in Part
IV.
The Comment concludes that it is all but automatic that a plea
agreement,4 or a substantive portion thereof desired by a prosecutor, will
be admitted against an accused. Also, it argues that the limits imposed
by the federal courts of appeals are ones of form, not function. Despite
the limits, chances are that the jury is going to hear at least the details of
the plea agreement, while they may not physically read the agreement in
the jury deliberation room. Also, a hypothetical is provided to demon-
strate "how to do a plea agreement in court."
II. GUIDANCE TO ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS
REGARDING PLEA AGREEMENTS
Besides the law in their respective jurisdictions, the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, United States Attorney's Manual, and Federal
Sentencing Guidelines provide guidance to the federal prosecutor in
determining whether to enter into a plea or immunity agreement and
what type to use. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 l(e)(1) governs
the acceptance or rejection of plea agreements.5 It provides:
The attorney for the government and the attorney for the defendant-
or the defendant when acting pro se-may agree that, upon the
defendant's entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged
3. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 547 N.E.2d 314 (Mass. 1989).
4. There are two types of agreements addressable in this Comment. The first is the
cooperation plea agreement, which has become somewhat standardized whereby the government
provides consideration in exchange for actions by a beneficiary witness. A second type of
instrument is apparent in the case law and is addressable herein, namely a grant of immunity and
order compelling the witness to testify. See United States v. McNeill, 728 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1984);
United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120 (1st Cir. 1981). These cases are cited for same
propositions asserted by cases using the cooperation type agreement. See United States v. Lord,
907 F.2d 1028, 1029 (10th Cir. 1990).
5. USAM, supra note 2, 9-16.300; see also USACRM, supra note 2, § 625.
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offense or to a lesser or related offense, the attorney for the govern-
ment will:
(A) move to dismiss other charges; or
(B) recommend, or agree not to oppose the defendant's request, for a
particular sentence, or sentencing range, or that a particular provision
of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing fac-
tor is or is not applicable to the case. Any such recommendation or
request is not binding on the court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropri-
ate disposition of the case, or that a particular provision of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor is or is
not applicable to the case. Such a plea agreement is binding on the
court once it is accepted by the court.
The court shall not participate in any discussions between the parties
concerning any such plea agreement.6
These are not the only subjects that may be included in a plea agree-
ment. For example, the prosecutor could agree to not bring charges
against another individual or the defendant. The plea agreement may
bind the defendant to cooperate in the prosecution of another case or
investigation.' Such cooperation may include testifying against another
participant in the underlying criminal transaction, or working in an
undercover capacity.
If the parties reach a plea agreement, the court shall require the
disclosure of the agreement in open court or in camera if good cause is
shown.8 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not specify
whether the show of good cause must be done in camera or in open
court. In accordance with Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(c)
and (d), the court may not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
until the court has determined that the defendant has the required under-
standing and that the plea is voluntary.9
Considerations often taken into account when deciding whether to
enter into a plea agreement include the: (1) defendant's willingness to
provide useful, timely information as part of an agreement; (2) defen-
dant's past criminal history; (3) nature and seriousness of the charged
offense; (4) defendant's attitude; (5) current stage of the trial process,
likelihood of conviction if the case was disposed of at trial; (6) effect of
testimony on witnesses at trial; (7) probable sentence accused may
receive if it went to trial; (8) whether public interest would be better
served by disposing the case at trial; (9) expense of a trial and appeal;
6. FED. R. CRIM. P. I I(e)(1).
7. USAM, supra note 2, 9-16.300; see also USACRM, supra note 2, § 625.
8. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 1(e)(2).
9. Id.
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and (10) the effect on the prompt disposition of other pending cases.' 0
In a multiple defendant case, prosecutors must take care to ensure
that the disposition of the charges against one defendant does not
adversely affect the investigation or prosecution of co-defendants. Some
adverse consequences also to be avoided are the potential negative jury
inference that may result when a relatively less culpable defendant is
tried in the absence of a more culpable defendant, or when the prosecu-
tion witness appears to be equally as culpable as the defendants, but has
been allowed to plead to a significantly less serious offense.''
There are various types of agreements a federal prosecutor may
pursue depending on the information a defendant is able to provide.
Benefits may be given to a defendant for many reasons, to include early
acknowledgement of criminal responsibility, essential information in an
ongoing investigation, and in-court testimony. Benefits are also varied,
from requiring the government to offer a non-binding recommendation
to impose a sentence at the lower end of the sentencing guideline range,
to a government commitment to file a motion under the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines for a downward departure in sentencing. Some of the
"buzz" provisions in the agreements include the downward departure,
acknowledgment of responsibility, and safety valve provisions. Down-
ward departure is the statutory allowance for courts to depart from the
guideline-specified sentence only where it finds "mitigating circum-
stance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission ... that should result in a sentence dif-
ferent from that described."'" Substantial assistance and acceptance of
responsibility provisions are separate. Substantial assistance is consid-
ered to be assistance rendered towards the investigation and prosecution
of criminal activities by persons other than the defendant. Acceptance
of responsibility is acknowledgment of the defendant's affirmative rec-
ognition of his own conduct.' 3 Plea agreements may also offer a minor
benefit, the so-called "safety valve," for first time offenders by allowing
a court to sentence at the low end of the sentencing range.
Due to the flood of appeals resulting from use of the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, many United States Attorney's offices in routine
cases have begun requiring waivers of appeal, including appeals of
sentences. 4 The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits have all held that plea bargained waivers of right
10. USAM, supra note 2, 9 9-27.420.
11. Id. at 9-27.430.B.4.
12. ROGER W. HAINES, JR. ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 7 (1999)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. 3553(b) (1999)).
13. Id. at 1018.
14. HAINES, supra note 12, at 27.
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to appeal do not violate public policy or due process. 5 In fact, the Ninth
Circuit has enforced an appeal waiver provision where the district court
imposed an upward departure, 16 and the Fifth Circuit sanctioned an
attorney who filed an appeal after his client waived that right in a plea
bargain. 7 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit has also allowed an appeal
where the defendant was informed he had a right to appeal, despite a
waiver of appeal provision in the plea bargain, and the prosecution failed
to object.' 8
The Supreme Court in United States v. Mezzanatto held that a crim-
inal defendant may elect to waive many important constitutional and
statutory rights during the plea bargaining.' 9 In Mezzanatto, the defen-
dant was arrested for drug distribution. He sought to plea bargain with
the government. As a condition to starting negotiations, the prosecutor
had Mezzanatto agree that he would have to be completely truthful and
that any statements he made during negotiations may be used to impeach
any possible trial testimony he may give. After discussions with his
attorney, Mezzanatto agreed. Negotiations subsquently failed and infor-
mation from the failed negotiations was used to impeach Mezzanatto
when he took the stand in his own defense at trial.
In construing the provisions of Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (e)(6) making statements
obtained in plea negotiations inadmissible against the declarant, the
Ninth Circuit held that Congress must have meant to preclude waiver
agreements.2" The Supreme Court reversed, validating the waiver.2 '
Thus, by entering plea agreements, defendants' statements could easily
come back to haunt them should they take the stand in any trial, includ-
ing when testifying for the government in a case other than their own.
The waivers of using statements from plea discussions for impeach-
ment, appeal, and the various types of other agreements provide the
prosecutor much leeway in determining what to offer a cooperative
defendant, or in choosing which defendant to strike a deal with in a
multi-defendant case. Depending on the form of agreement, it is within
the prosecutor's discretion whether to even make the motion for a down-
ward departure under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Additionally,
15. Id.
16. United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1991).
17. United States v. Gitan, 171 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 1999).
18. United States v. Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the district court's
oral pronouncement controls and therefore the written waiver is unenforceable) (cited in HAINES,
supra note 12, at 29).
19. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995); see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411
U.S. 258, 267 (1973).
20. See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 200.
21. Id. at 211.
2001]
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the judge is under no obligation to grant a motion for downward depar-
ture. In spite of these facts, downward departures do happen quite often.
From 1994 through 1998, twenty-nine to thirty-three percent of all fed-
eral offenders were granted downward departures from the sentencing
range applicable to their case.22
III. PURPOSES SERVED BY INTRODUCING THE
PLEA AGREEMENT IN A TRIAL
A. Proper Use in General by Prosecutors
Introducing evidence of a plea agreement or some component
thereof during direct examination may serve one or more purposes. Its
admissibility "turns on the purpose for which it is offered. '2 3 The "most
frequent purpose" is to allow the jury to accurately assess the credibility
of the witness.2 4
Prosecutors may elicit some information to lay out a witness's
background and to give the jury a fuller understanding of the witness's
testimony, 25 perhaps to explain how the witness has first-hand knowl-
edge concerning the events about which he is testifying. 26 The impor-
22. HAINES, supra note 12, at 1019 n.2, n.3, and accompanying text.
23. United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1981).
24. United States v. Werme, 939 F.2d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing United States v.
Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1363 (3d Cir. 1991)); see United States v. King, 505 F.2d 602 (5th Cir.
1974); Isaac v. United States, 431 F.2d 11 (9th Cir. 1970).
25. See generally Raysor v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir.
1985); cf Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Grant, 775 F.2d 508, 513 (3d Cir. 1985). Background
evidence is not a well-defined concept:
The jurisprudence of "background evidence" is essentially undeveloped.
"Background" or "preliminary" evidence is not mentioned in the evidence codes,
nor has it received attention in the treatises. One justification for its admission, at
least in terms of the background of a witness qua witness, is that it may establish
absence of bias or motive by showing the witness' relationship (or non-relationship)
to the parties or to the case. It may also be said to bear on the credibility of the
witness by showing the witness to be a stable person. The routine admission of
evidence that an accused has never ben arrested would thus seem to be a function of
years of practice and of the common sense notion that it is helpful for the trier of
fact to know something about a defendant's background when evaluating his
culpability... In determining whether to admit background evidence, however, wide
discretion should remain with the trial court ..... We also note that in view of the
relatively low probative value of such evidence, particularly when coming from the
defendant, refusal to admit such evidence, even if error, would be harmless.
Grant, 775 F.2d at 513. The difference between background and character evidence may be
blurred. "[A]t some point a defendant who goes too far with evidence indicating good character,
despite attempts to characterize it as background evidence, might find that the door to rebuttal
evidence has been opened." Id. at 513 n.7.
26. United States v. Universal Rehab. Serv. (PA), Inc. 205 F.3d 657, 667 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000)
(en banc). As the Universal court explained:
although one might view this as a corollary to the credibility rationale, members of
the jury may still question whether the witness's testimony is worthy of belief. The
[Vol. 55:707
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tance of background information may be envisioned if one thinks about
a prosecution witness/co-conspirator providing testimony on a complex
drug smuggling ring without being able to explain how he obtained this
information. Jurors would be missing an integral piece of information as
they sat bewildered as to how this witness is testifying on such a matter
with no apparent means to gain access to such information.
Other purposes are to show that the prosecution has nothing to
hide, 27 and for the jury to better assess the witness's potential conflicting
motivations behind her testimony.28 Inherent in all these purposes is a
constant tension. These conflicting motivations include the govern-
ment's desire to elicit what happened in a particular criminal transaction
and to ensure justice is served, with a criminal's desire to lessen his
punishment by whatever means possible. To this end, prosecutors need
to respond to juror concern over the likelihood of false testimony tend-
ing to lessen the witness's involvement and to increase the defendant's
involvement in the transaction.
Other valid purposes for providing the jury with background infor-
mation include anticipating an attack by the other side, regardless of
whether the defense intends to use the agreement to impeach the wit-
ness's testimony.29 In effect, the prosecution would be impeaching his
own witness, thus stealing the defense's thunder on cross-examination
and eliminating any concern that the jury may harbor over whether the
government has selectively prosecuted the defendant.3" This should also
counter potential jury apprehension concerning inequitable results
between two equally culpable criminals and explain why the prosecu-
tion's witness is getting more lenient treatment for his participation in
the same criminal transaction as the other defendant(s). To illustrate,
consider a case where a prosecution witness is equally culpable with the
defendant for the underlying crime. If the facts of a plea or immunity
agreement were not made apparent to the jury, the jurors may feel com-
fact that the witness has pled guilty to an offense concerning the very events that
required his or her testimony makes it that much more likely that the testimony is
truthful and reliable, as an individual typically does not plead guilty to an offense in
the absence of culpability.
Id. at 667. As such, the prosecution in the Universal trial court was entitled to introduce the
uncharged co-conspirators' pleas in order to answer any question the jury might have concerning
how they possessed knowledge of the events and actions described in their testimony. Id.; see
also United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1981).
27. United States v. Hilton, 772 F.2d 783, 787 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Halbert, 640 F.2d at 1005.
28. United States v. Townsend, 796 F.2d 158, 163 (6th Cir. 1986).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 899 (7th Cir. 1998).
30. See Universal, 205 F.3d at 667; United States v. Gaev, 24 F.3d 473, 479 (3d Cir. 1994);
United States v. Inadi, 790 F.2d 383, 384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986).
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pelled to find the defendant not guilty of crimes besides those that the
witness admitted to committing in his testimony.
The 1997 Supreme Court case Old Chief v. United States describes
the necessity for the prosecution, with its burden of persuasion, to have
"evidentiary depth to tell a continuous story."'" A component of this
evidentiary depth may be to appease juror expectations concerning what
proper proof in a criminal trial should be by providing the presumed
requisite evidence, lest the prosecutor run the risk of incurring a juror's
wrath and negative inference about the prosecution. 32 Another compo-
nent may be the need to provide the jurors with the moral underpinning
to decide against the accused, "the prosecution may fairly seek to place
its evidence before the jurors, as much to tell a story of guiltiness as to
support an inference of guilt, to convince the jurors that a guilty verdict
would be morally reasonable as much as to point to discrete elements of
a defendant's legal fault."
33
This line of discussion in Old Chief is highly supportive of the
admissibility of plea agreements. In this context, it stands for prosecutor
flexibility to "weave her tale" to create a coherent narrative of an
accused's thoughts and actions in perpetrating the offense for which he
is tried. When considered with the incremental easing of limits on plea
agreements used in the federal circuit courts of appeal, Old Chief pro-
vides an imposing tool against an accused in a case that contains wit-
nesses who have signed immunity or plea agreements.
B. Improper Use of Plea Agreements by Prosecutors
Before examining this topic, a discussion about the importance of
the defense attorney quickly objecting when an error is made by prose-
cutors on direct examination is merited. Charged error will be more
difficult to challenge if no objection is raised at the trial level. If no
objection is raised, the appellate court will review for plain error under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b).34 Under the plain error doc-
trine, courts will recognize only "those errors that 'seriously affect the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings,' and...
will reverse solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of jus-
tice would otherwise result. '3 5 The importance of objecting will become
31. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 190 (1997).
32. Id. at 188 (citing Stephen A. Saltzberg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering
Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1011, 1019
(1978)).
33. See id. at 188 (citing United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 100-02 (2d Cir. 1993)).
34. United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1386 (9th Cir. 1986).
35. United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1473 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v.
Young, 470 U.S. I, 15 (1985) (citation omitted)).
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apparent in the cases that are discussed in this Comment, as many of
those cited will be evaluated under this standard due to the defense
counsel's failure to object.
1. IMPROPER BOLSTERING 3 6
Plea or immunity agreements may not be offered to bolster the
immunized or beneficiary witness's credibility. The Federal Rules of
Evidence forbid bolstering a witness's credibility absent an attack under
Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a).3 7 Rule 608(a) limits evidence support-
ing or attacking a witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness
to opinion or reputation evidence. Furthermore, this evidence is admis-
sible only after the witness's character for truthfulness has been
attacked, again, by "opinion or reputation or otherwise.'"" The "or oth-
erwise" attack includes a "Perry Mason rapier-like" cross-examination
that utterly destroys a witness's truthful character.39 Admitting, as most
circuits have done, plea agreements (or provisions of plea agreements)
on direct examination prior to any attack in evidence by the defense, for
purposes of allowing the prosecutor to "weave his tale" during a case or
"allowing the jurors to get a full background of the witness," opens a
tension between the item's admissibility and Rule 608(a)(2). This ten-
sion will be explored later in this Comment.
2. INFERRING GUILT TO DEFENDANT
In addition to the tension described above, plea agreements may not
36. Improper bolstering may be distinguished from improper vouching, although many courts
appear to merge the two concepts. See United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1499 n.l (10th Cir.
1990). For precision's sake, vouching, as opposed to bolstering as described in this Part, may be
described as in infra Part III.B.3. as the government's impermissible placing of its prestige behind
a client, a prosecutor or government acting as a guarantor of the witness's truthfulness, or a
prosecutor relying on evidence not within the jury's purview. Compare Bowie, 892 F.2d at 1498-
99 (analyzing concepts of "credibility-vouching" and "credibility bolstering" separately) with
United States v. Hendersen, 717 F.2d 135, 137-38 (4th Cir. 1983) (defining the concept of
bolstering similar to Bowie, then declaring the facts of that case to not be a form of bolstering or
vouching) and Commonwealth v. Rivera, 712 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Mass. 1999) (defining
"vouching" in terms of bolstering). Bowie also cites United States v. Townsend, 796 F.2d 158,
162-63 (6th Cir. 1986), as an example of a court merging the concepts. This is not the case, as
Townsend mentions only bolstering, and defines the concept similarly to Bowie.
37. This is the "legal irrelevance doctrine." At the point a prosecutor bolsters a witness,
before the witness's cross-examination, the court does not know whether the witness would be
attacked by the opponent. The witness's testimony may be so innocuous that the opponent may
not cross-examine her. In that event, the time spent bolstering the witness is wasted. Therefore,
the proponent must wait until the witness is attacked on cross-examination. Then the proponent
may rehabilitate the witness on redirect. RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING
MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 360 (4th ed. 1997).
38. FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
39. The author acknowledges and thanks Professor Lee B. Schinasi of the University of
Miami School of Law for this example.
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be introduced to show a co-conspirator's guilt as substantive evidence of
another defendant's guilt.4° "The foundation of [this] policy is the right
of every defendant to stand or fall with the proof of the charge made
against him, not against somebody else .... The defendant ha[s] a right
to have his guilt or innocence determined by the evidence presented
against him, not by what has happened with regard to a criminal prose-
cution against someone else."'"
A manifestation of this policy may be seen in the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals case United States v. Casto,4 2 which addressed the
question of the prosecution's use of a co-conspirator's guilty plea for a
presumed impermissible purpose. In Casto, the prosecutor asked the
witness, who had pled guilty for a drug transaction in which the defen-
dant was being tried, whether she had been charged in the same case
with possession with intent to distribute and whether she pled guilty to
that offense.43 At this point, the defense counsel objected, and the judge
allowed it with a curative instruction pursuant to Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 105.44 The question, however, was never answered, and the pros-
ecutor moved on with other questions.45 At the close of the witness's
testimony, the judge again gave a curative instruction on the witness's
testimony and a third instruction was given when he charged the jury.4 6
On appeal, the defendant argued that the prosecutor's introduction
of the co-conspirator's guilty plea constituted reversible error because
the prosecutor did not have a legitimate purpose in introducing the plea,
and it was only done to create the inference of the defendant's guilt.
4 7
The government countered by arguing that the defendant's counsel
opened the door when he called into question the co-conspirator wit-
ness's credibility during the opening statement. 48 The court ruled that
although the defense counsel did not openly refer to the witness's guilty
plea, he had invited the jury to consider any of the witness testimony
with suspicion, thus providing a "legitimate reason" for the prosecutor's
40. United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1363 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Hutchings, 751 F.2d 230, 237 (8th Cir. 1984); Baker v. United States, 393 F.2d 604, 614 (9th Cir.
1968).
41. Bisaccia v. Attorney Gen. of New Jersey, 623 F.2d 307, 312 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting
United States v. Toner, 173 F.2d 140, 142 (3d Cir. 1949)). Bisaccia was a habeas corpus
proceeding which held that a prosecutor's use of a co-conspirator's guilty plea to establish another
defendant's guilt was error, and was remanded for a determination of whether the error was
harmless.
42. 889 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1989).
43. Id. at 566.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 566-67.
47. Id. at 567.
48. Id.
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question.49 Therefore, the prosecutor was permitted to defuse the poten-
tial attack on direct examination of her witness.5 0  The court remarked
that, "[c]ounsel presenting witnesses of blemished reputation routinely
bring out such adverse facts as they will know be developed on cross-
examination in order to avoid even the appearance of an intent to
conceal.'
Additionally, the curative instructions issued by the court elimi-
nated the prejudice of the co-conspirator's guilty plea .5  Regarding cur-
ative instructions, the court said, "circumstances of . . . [a] case
overcome the curative effect of the instruction when the guilty plea of
one co-defendant implicates another or others," but that did not occur in
the instant case. 53 Lastly, because the co-defendant's guilty plea did not
establish any facts that the defendant attempted to deny, there was no
reversible error.54
3. IMPROPER VOUCHING
The government may be vouching by "placing the prestige of the
government behind the witness, '55 by implying information not heard by
the jury56 that supports the witness's veracity5 7 by implying that the
government has independently verified the witness's veracity,58 or by
expressing a personal opinion as to a witness's credibility. 9 Con-
versely, where a prosecutor states in his closing argument, "[w]e brought
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id (citations and internal quotations omitted).
52. Id. at 567-68. The court classified labeled the instruction as a "clear and strong
cautionary instruction... that [the jury] might use the accomplice's guilty plea only to assess her
credibility as a witness and not to create an inference of guilt against the accused." Id.
53. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
54. Id.
55. See United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1133-35 (lst Cir. 1981); United States v.
Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Oregon v. Charbonneau, 913 P.2d 308, 311
(Or. 1996) (where the state drafted into an actual agreement that the primary reason for the
agreement is that, based on the witness's statements and its investigation, the state believes the
charge actually reflects the role the defendant played in the victim's death). Commonwealth v.
Lain, 684 A.2d 153, 157 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), defined "bolstering" as whenever a state places its
prestige of the government behind the witness through personal assurances of his or her veracity
or indicates that information not before the jury supports the witness's testimony. This would
more accurately be described as improper vouching. Bolstering is better described as the
improper evidentiary practice of increasing the witness's standing in front of the jury before an
attack on her truthful character. See supra note 36, and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 900 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659, 664 (5th
Cir. 1979).
57. Orebo v. United States, 293 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1961).
58. United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1450 (8th Cir. 1996).
59. Id. at 1449; see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934).
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you those people to testify," and "I'm confident that you'll agree that
these individuals are all involved in the same conspiracy. . . ," the Sev-
enth Circuit found that the latter statement was merely a summary of the
government's theory of the case, while the former was "equally equivo-
cal."60 Even if the former statement could cause a jury to infer that a
prosecutor personally believed that the government witnesses were tell-
ing the truth, the court's limiting instruction was "sufficient to dispel
any possible inference that the government could vouch for the witness's
veracity. '"61
i. A Prosecutor May Not Imply She Possesses Information
Not Heard by the Jury
A wonderful example of how not to do a closing argument may be
seen in United States v. Garza.6" The court reversed because of persis-
tent and repeated references to matters not before the jury regarding the
dedication and professionalism of the testifying agents of the Drug
Enforcement Agency. The comments included, "He's a professional
man .... And if he wasn't good at it ... when he was doing it with the
San Antonio Police Department, if he wasn't doing a good job over
there, do you think he would ever have gotten on with the [Drug
Enforcement Agency]?"63 This information was not in the record. This
all preceded another line of argument, to the effect that the prosecutor
would not be participating in the case if the defendant's guilt had already
not been determined. These two lines of argument, first articulated on
the closing, and later on rebuttal, comprised reversible plain error.64
In United States v. Roberts, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district
court because of the prosecutor's remarks that referred to matters outside
the record.65 The prosecutor erred in exploiting a state trooper's pres-
ence at the trial who was monitoring the witness who signed a plea
60. Mealy, 851 F.2d at 900.
61. Id. The court's limiting instruction was:
The witnesses, [M, R, J, 1, and B], have agreed to plead guilty to a crime arising out
of the same occurrence for which the defendants are now on trial. These witnesses
have received immunity from prosecution for other crimes; that is a promise by the
government that any testimony or other information they provided would not be
used against them in a criminal case. You may give their testimony such weight as
you feel it deserves, keeping in mind that it must be considered with caution and
great care. Moreover, their guilty plea is not to be considered as evidence against
the defendants.
Id. at 900 n.9. See also Hedman, 630 F.2d at 1199.
62. 608 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1979). The Fifth Circuit refers to the examples cited in its opinion
as "virtually textbook examples of what a closing argument should not be." Id. at 664 n.3.
63. Id. at 661.
64. Id. at 666.
65. 618 F.2d 530, 545 (9th Cir. 1980).
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agreement. In this case, in his closing argument, the prosecutor made
much of the wide divergence between the defendant's and witness's tes-
timony. One of the witnesses had to be lying, he argued. To buttress the
government witness, the prosecutor pointed out a state trooper present in
the courtroom, and stated that the trooper was there to monitor the gov-
ernment witness's testimony to ensure the witness told the truth. The
prosecutor's remarks were fatal. The Ninth Circuit found "the remarks,
fairly construed, were based on the District Attorney's personal knowl-
edge apart from the evidence in the case and that the jury might have so
understood them."6 6 The prosecutor referred to evidence outside the
record by stating that the trooper was monitoring the witness's testi-
mony.67 The jury could infer that the trooper had personal knowledge of
the relevant facts and was satisfied that those facts were accurately
stated by the government witness.68 In effect, the prosecutor told the
jury that another witness could be called to corroborate the witness's
testimony.6 9
The defense attorney objected to the prosecutor's remarks at trial,
but was overruled.7" The Ninth Circuit stated it would have been helpful
if the defense counsel had asked for a curative instruction, but this was
not necessary where the error is brought to the court's attention and
curative action is clearly warranted.7' Absent a curative instruction, in
analyzing error, the court will apply the "plain error" standard under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52. Here, the error rose to that
level, so the lack of a curative instruction was not fatal to the defendant
on appeal.
Roberts stands for the proposition that a prosecutor may not tell the
jury that the government has confirmed a witness's credibility before
using that witness.72 This is improper vouching because it invites the
jury to rely on the government's assessment of the witness. 73 The prose-
cutor may not portray itself as a guarantor of truthfulness.74
Lastly, another Ninth Circuit case is illustrative of impermissible
66. Id. 533-34 (citing Orebo v. United States, 293 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1961)).




71. Id.; see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1934) (discussing the
prosecutor's overstepping the bounds of propriety and fairness which called for stem rebuke).
72. Roberts, 618 F.2d at 536. Roberts is very informative for the level of analysis and
guidance to a prosecutor in making use of a government witness's promise to testify truthfully.
This guidance is incorporated in the hypothetical application in the Conclusion infra.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 537; see also United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 756-57 (6th Cir. 1979); United
States v, Ellis, 547 F.2d 863, 869 (5th Cir. 1977).
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reference to matters outside the purview of the jury. In United States v.
Brown, the prosecutor made numerous references to polygraph provi-
sions within a plea agreement, in which the witnesses would submit to
verification of their stories through a polygraph testy.7  The prosecutor
attempted to offer the entire agreement into evidence at the end of the
direct examination of one of the witnesses. The court withheld ruling
until after defense cross-examination and then admitted the agreement.
The Ninth Circuit found that the polygraph test references within the
plea agreement were "particularly invidious,"76 and constituted revers-
ible error.77
ii. A Prosecutor May Not Imply His Personal Opinion
Regarding Witness Credibility
A statement made by the prosecutor in closing argument regarding
a witness's arrangement made with the government to testify "truth-
fully" was at issue in United States v. Miceli.78 The court examined the
prosecutor's remark to determine if it was intended as an expression of
his personal opinion about the veracity of a witness. 79 The court found,
however, that the defense did not object to the remark.8" Thus, the First
Circuit analyzed the error under the plain error standard and found the
prosecutor may have been referring to other evidence to suggest the wit-
ness, an admitted perjurer, was telling the truth.8' The court stated that a
defense objection would have enabled the trial court to give a clarifying
instruction. 2
Ten years later, in the Second Circuit case United States v. Mod-
ica,83 the witness ("A"), who entered into a plea agreement, performed
poorly on the stand. The prosecutor thus felt compelled to argue in
favor of A's credibility in his summation. Initially, the prosecutor kept
his rehabilitative efforts at arms length by using the rhetorical phrase, "I
suggest that." The prosecutor then shifted to outright endorsement. "I'm
not here telling you that Mr. [A] is your A-I, class-1 citizen. I'm here to
tell you that Mr. [A]'s testimony when it relates to this case is truthful."
The court stated that the "I'm here to tell you" phrase was improper, and
quoted American Bar Association Standard for Criminal Justice 3-
75. United States v. Brown, 720 F.2d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 1983).
76. Id. at 1072.
77. Id. at 1075.
78. 446 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1971).




83. 663 F.2d 1173 (2d Cir. 1981).
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5.8(b), which states, "[i]t is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to
express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of
any testimony or evidence or guilt of the defendant."84 Although the
court did not reverse the trial below, it did discuss available methods of
sanctioning85 for prosecutors who engage in this sort of behavior.86
Ten years after Modica, the Eighth Circuit, in United States v.
Freisinger, dealt with a defendant who appealed in part because of his
contention that the prosecutor overused the pronoun "I," thus injecting
his personal beliefs as to the credibility of the witness and personalizing
his arguments.87 In addressing the issue, the court discussed the diffi-
84. The current version of Standard 3-5.8(b) eliminated the phrase "it is unprofessional
conduct." The standard now states, "The prosecutor should not express his or her personal belief
or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant."
American Bar Association, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION &
DEFENSE FUNCTION, 
3
RD (1993), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pfunctoc.
html.
85. Modica, 663 F.2d at 1182-86.
86. The Modica court at least acknowledged the intent of the American Bar Association
Professional Standard. In the 1961 Supreme Court case United States v. Lawn, 355 U.S. 357
(1958), the Court addressed a prosecutor's comment stating, "We vouch for [the testifying
witnesses] because we think they are telling the truth," in a footnote. Id. at 360 n.15. The Court
stated that the prosecutor's comment was not improper, since it was not based, implicitly or
explicitly, on personal knowledge, or anything other than the witness's testimony before the jury.
Id. The Court noted that the prosecutor's comment was made in response to defense attacking
statements made closing summation, and that the district court issued a curative instruction in its
charge to the jury. Id. Also, as noted by the circuit court on the first direct appeal, there was an
overwhelming amount of evidence against the defendants. Id. After instructing the jury that they
were the sole judges of witness credibility, the judge instructed them regarding the accomplice-
witness, "You have got to be particularly careful in scrutinizing his testimony to see whether to
save his own skin he lied to hurt somebody else or whether he had some other motive for lying to
hurt somebody else." Id. As to the other witness, the judge instructed, "I am going to tell you to
be just as careful with his testimony as you would with an accomplice, and look and scrutinize it
carefully." Id.
The Lawn Court buried the error; the prosecution did exactly what it was not supposed to do,
namely, base his argument on his personal opinion. The Court then disposed of the entire
assignment for error in a footnote, and did not even address the improper prosecutorial conduct.
The three circuit court cases cited for support in Lawn all address the alleged prosecutorial
misconduct. Two of those three cited cases dealt with statements made by the prosecutor directed
towards the accused as opposed to statement made in support of a testifying witness. See
Henderson v. United States, 218 F. 14, 19 (6th Cir. 1955) (". . it is not misconduct to express [the
prosecutor's] individual belief in the guilt of the accused, if such belief is based solely on the
evidence introduced and the jury is not led to believe that there is other evidence, known to the
prosecutor but not introduced, justifying that belief.") (emphasis in original); United States v.
Holt, 108 F. 365, 370 (7th Cir. 1939). The last one, Tuckerman v. United States, 291 F. 958, 969
(6th Cir. 1923), dealt with the prosecutor's patriotic plea to the jurors to find the defendant guilty.
The reasoning in Lawn would have been consistent with reasoning seen in other cases had the
Court noted that it was improper for the prosecution to make the statemet, but then find the error
harmless due to the reasons cited. At issue, however, was only one "slip of the toungue." This
was not a case of repeated instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Compare the singular instance
in Lawn with the recurring misconduct in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84-89 (1934).
87. United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 385 (8th Cir. 1991).
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culty in excluding the word "I" from one's speech. As an example, it
pointed out that while the defendant complained about the prosecutor's
use of the word "I" thirty-five times during his closing argument, the
defendant's counsel used it fifty-one times. The circuit court cited Mod-
ica, and expanded on the reason for the rule against improperly expres-
sing a prosecutor's personal opinion:
The policies underlying this proscription go to the heart of a fair trial.
The prosecutor is cloaked with the authority of the United States
Government; he stands before the jury as the community's represen-
tative. His remarks are those, not simply of an advocate, but rather of
a federal official duty-bound to see that justice is done. The jury
knows that he has prepared and presented the case and that he has
complete access to the facts uncovered in the government's investiga-
tion. Thus, when the prosecutor conveys to the jurors his personal
view that a witness spoke the truth, it may be difficult for them to
ignore his views, however biased and baseless they may in fact be.88
In Freisinger, the prosecutor used devices such as, "I submit to you
that the testimony you heard from the officers was the truth."89 Addi-
tionally, he argued, "[t]hey came here and told the truth." 9° The court
reasoned that these argument devices were not only improper, but
unnecessary. "Counsel can just as easily argue issues of credibility
without injecting personal views. The kind of arguments made here at
the very least suggests that the government may know something that
the jury does not. Government must eschew that kind of argumentation,
even when couching the argument in less brazen language."'" Because
there was no defense objection, the error was examined for plain error
under Rule 52. The court determined that while the prosecutor's
remarks were unquestionably improper, they did not deprive the defen-
dant of a fair trial, and thus did not rise to the level of plain error.
92
In United States v. Keskey, the Seventh Circuit found that a letter
from an Assistant United States Attorney regarding a government wit-
ness's credibility appeared to express the personal opinion that the wit-
ness was telling the truth, and amounted to improper vouching.93 The
letter was sent to the witness's lawyer, and admitted into evidence.94
The appellant argued notwithstanding that the government may elicit
testimony on direct examination regarding a witness's plea or immunity
agreement, "in introducing evidence of plea agreements, the prosecutor
88. Id. at 386 (citing United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173 (2d Cir. 1981)).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 386-87.
92. Id.
93. United States v. Keskey, 863 F.2d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 1988).
94. Id.
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may not . . . imply his personal opinion that a witness is telling the
truth."95 The court found that the letter did appear to express the per-
sonal opinion of the Assistant United States Attorney that the witness
was telling the truth. The portion of the letter that the appellant found
objectionable read:
In her statement your client admitted to facts which establish some
criminal culpability on her part; however, her statement was consis-
tent with other evidence already acquired which indicates that her
culpability was relatively minimal. The information she provided
appeared to be truthful, and she is apparently willing to cooperate
with the investigation and possible prosecution in this matter.96
Because the defendant's attorney did not object to the letter's admission
during the trial, however, the court again evaluated it under the standard
of plain error.9 7 Like the Eighth Circuit in Freisinger, the Seventh Cir-
cuit found the letter's admission did not rise to the level of reversible
error.9 8 First, while the prosecutor did read the letter into evidence
before the jury, the Assistant United States Attorney did not elaborate on
it during direct examination, nor did it come up in the cross examina-
tion.99 Secondly, neither attorney mentioned it during closing argu-
ment.' 0 This reduced the emphasis placed on the letter.' 0 1 Next, the
testimony for whose veracity the letter vouched was not as damaging as
other witnesses' testimony. 02 Lastly, at the end of the trial, the court
provided a limiting instruction on that witness's testimony. 03 The court
found that while there was a slight risk that the defendant's "substantial
rights" were affected, the error was harmless.'0 4
In United States v. Ludwig, the Tenth Circuit found reversible error
where the district attorney personally vouched for the integrity of the
New Mexico state police, one of whose members was a prosecution wit-
ness. 0 5 The prosecutor said in part:
I know one thing you can be proud of, it's the New Mexico State
Police .... the finest ... I've personally seen ... I know personally
95. Id. (citing United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 900 (7th Cir. 1988)).
96. Id.
97. Id. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.







105. 508 F.2d 140, 142-43 (10th Cir. 1974). The prosecutor said in part: "I know one thing
you can be proud of, it's the New Mexico State Police .... the finest... I've personally seen ... I
know personally that can't be said of a lot of police forces .... [they] are people you can be proud
of and they do their job, no matter what the consequences to them..." Id. at 143.
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that can't be said of a lot of police forces .... [they] are people you
can be proud of and they do their job, no matter what the conse-
quences to them ... .06
The court reasoned, "prosecuting attorneys ... in their closing argument
... should not, [note here that the court merges the concepts of bolster-
ing and vouching] in an effort to bolster the credibility of the govern-
ment witness, place their own integrity, directly or indirectly, on the
scales. Such is improper, and . . . may well end in a reversal which
could have easily been avoided."'
01 7
If the importance of objections and requests for proper limiting
instructions are not yet apparent, consider the Seventh Circuit's reason-
ing in United States v. Mealy where the trial court's use of a timely
limiting instruction to use caution when evaluating the government wit-
ness's testimony possibly saved the case from reversal. 0 8
IV. ADMISSIBILITY ISSUES' ° 9
Federal Rule of Evidence 402 provides that all relevant evidence is
admissible, except as provided by Congress, the Constitution, the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, or other rules as promulgated by the Supreme
Court. Rule 402 also provides that irrelevant evidence is inadmissible.
Relevant evidence is defined by Federal Rule of Evidence 401 as "evi-
dence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."" '
Witnesses provide evidence in the form of testimony. Under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 607, any party may impeach a witness's credibil-
ity, including the party calling the witness."'I Recall, however, that a
witness's credibility may not be bolstered absent an attack on her credi-
106. Id. at 143.
107. Id.
108. United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 900 (7th Cir. 1988).
109. Admissibility issues are labeled as evidentiary issues in appellate courts. Evidentiary
rulings by a federal district court judge will be overturned in the federal district courts of appeals
only for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Orlando-Figuroa, No. 99-6820, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 231 (1st Cir. Jan. 10, 2000); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1188 (2d
Cir. 1989); United States v. Johnson, 199 F.3d 123, 125 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Rebrook,
58 F.3d 961, 967 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Wallace, 32 F.3d 921, 927 (5th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Taplin, 954 F.2d 1256, 1258 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Dominguez, 992
F.2d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 1993); cf United States v. Tucker, 137 F.3d 1016, 1035 (8th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Patterson, 678 F.2d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Toledo, 985 F.2d
1462, 1469-70 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v.Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1497 (1 lth Cir. 1985).
Even if errors were found, non-constitutional errors would not require reversal unless it was
alleged it was "more probable than not" that the error affected the verdict.
110. FED. R. EvnD. 401.
111. FED. R. EvID. 607.
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bility. 112 A witness testifying pursuant to a plea or immunity agreement
would typically have her credibility tested by an attack on cross-exami-
nation, followed by rehabilitation on redirect examination. 
113
Components of a plea or immunity agreement which may be
brought out in testimony appear from the case law and templates viewed
by the author to include:
1. the very fact that a plea or immunity agreement exists, to include
that the witness is pleading, or has pled, guilty for involvement in
some crime;
2. that the witness is testifying under an agreement that requires him
to provide truthful testimony;
3. that the witness understands that he will be sentenced in accor-
dance with some sort of sentencing guidance, whether it be fed-
era1 14 or state,'15 depending on the jurisdiction;
4. that the defendant must provide assistance in other investigations
in exchange for the consideration as listed in paragraph 5 below;
5. that in exchange for truthful testimony, the defendant is to receive
some sort of consideration by the prosecution to lessen his punish-
ment; this may be in the form of:
the prosecution not objecting to defendant's argument for lower
sentence;
the prosecution recommending that the court impose a sentence at
the lower end of the sentencing guideline range;
the prosecution either agreeing to merely consider, or actually
obligating itself, to move the court to depart from the sentencing
guideline range;
the prosecution agreeing to not file certain charges or dismiss cer-
tain counts or charges against the defendant;
6. that the defendant agrees to voluntarily forfeit his right, title, and
interest in certain assets due to their deriving from proceeds of, for
example, an illegal drug activity;
7. a more generic understanding of the plea agreement, for purposes
of testifying to that understanding.
Issues of admissibility regarding plea or immunity agreements
depend on the content of that to be admitted, along with the timing of
the admission. The law is technically varied along these lines between
the federal circuit courts of appeal and between the states. Some circuits
have addressed: whether the terms of the plea agreement are admissible;
whether only impeaching terms are admissible, as opposed to bolstering
112. See 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 608.11 (2d ed. 2000); 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 607.1 (5th
ed. 2001).
113. United States v. Cosentino, 844 F.2d 30, 32-33 (2d Cir. 1988).
114. See generally HAINES, supra note 12.
115. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.703 and forms located at FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.991.
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terms; whether the "truthfulness term" is admissible; whether the wit-
ness's understanding of the plea agreement is admissible; and whether
the entire physical agreement itself is admissible.
These components appear to be artificial headings. For instance, if
a witness describes his "understanding," potentially this testimony may
also allow in the "terms" of the agreement. Examining the bulleted list
above, for instance, items two through six appear on their face to be
terms to which a witness could testify to express his understanding of
the plea or immunity agreement. The case law is not clear as to what
constitutes "the terms" of the agreement, as opposed to "the witness's
understanding" of the agreement, or the vaguely termed "evidence of the
plea agreement." Which terms impeach? Which terms bolster? And
lastly, if a circuit court allows an entire plea agreement to be admitted,
would that not allow the terms to be admitted? The case law does not
elaborate on the meaning of these terms, except for those addressing
whether the plea agreement itself maybe admitted. Notwithstanding this
vagueness, this Comment forges ahead to define the current trends
among the circuits regarding these components of plea agreements, and
demonstrates why they really do not matter.
As concluded later in this Part, case law has evolved to the point
where all the circuit courts of appeal do not even require defense attack,
but only an adequate representation as to the purposes for introducing
information on the plea agreement in the prosecution's case-in-chief.
This is because the various courts of appeal provide a low threshold for
prosecutors to get substantive information regarding practically any plea
agreement admitted into evidence, in keeping with the supporting Old
Chief opinion.
A. Admissibility of the Existence and Truthful Testimony
Requirement of a Plea Agreement
As case law developed in the 1970's and 1980's on various aspects
of plea agreements, the grounds of many appellate cases regarding plea
or immunity agreement is the elicitation of the mere fact that there is an
agreement or perhaps only where the existence of the truth-telling provi-
sions of a plea agreement have been elicited. ' 6 These grounds of the
116. The consideration given by the United States to the witness taking a plea deal is typically
based on the United States making a recommendation at sentencing that the court reduce by two
or three levels the sentencing guideline level applicable to the defendant's offense, pursuant to
section 3E.lI of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The United States may often make this
agreement contingent on cooperation so that they would not be required to make this
recommendation if the defendant: (I) fails or refuses to make a full, accurate, and complete
disclosure of the circumstances surrounding the relevant offense conduct; (2) is found to have
misrepresented the facts to the government prior to entering the plea agreement; or (3) commits
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appeals were based upon a theory that the elicitation or introduction of
these provisions are unlawful bolstering or vouching by the government
for its witnesses. This line of argument has been largely ineffective. The
beneficiary-witness's credibility is often called into question during an
opponent's closing argument, particularly when an attack on the wit-
ness's credibility on cross-examination opens the door for a witness's
credibility rehabilitation.
1. ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT
All of the circuit courts of appeal, except the Sixth and Eleventh
which have not directly addressed the issue, are in agreement that the
equities are balanced between the prosecution and defense if a plea
agreement's existence is introduced into evidence." 7 Thus, elicitation
of that fact is admissible. 18
The practice is justified by the same considerations that underlie the
"completeness" rule codified in Fed. R. Evid. 106. A party ought to
be able to extract the complete testimony of his witness, including the
essential circumstances bearing on its believability, rather than forced
to leave gaping holes to be poked at by his opponent. This is particu-
larly true in the matter of a plea or immunity agreement, since the
jury is bound to wonder from the outset why someone should be testi-
fying to all these things that damn him along with the defendant, and
having wondered may be shocked or puzzled to discover the reason
for the first time on cross-examination. A trial is not just combat; it is
also truth-seeking; and each party is entitled to place its case before
the jury at one time in an orderly, measured, and balanced fashion,
and thus spare the jury from having to deal with bombshells later on.
It is on this theory that defense counsel, in beginning their examina-
tion of a defendant, will often ask him about his criminal record,
knowing that if they do not ask, the prosecutor will do so on cross-
examination. . . What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the
gander. "'9
The question was still open in the Third Circuit until the case of Univer-
any misconduct after entering into the plea agreement. These three listed items may be
cumulatively thought of as the "truthfulness" provisions. Examples of cases will be discussed
infra.
117. United States v. McNeill, 728 F.2d 5, 14 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Henderson, 717
F.2d 135, 137 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Townsend 796 F.2d 158, 163 (6th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 899 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Drews, 877 F.2d 10,
12 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1499 (10th Cir. 1990).
118. See the synoptic chart in Part VI, infra. The author could not find cases supporting this
assertion from the Sixth or Eleventh Circuits. Where those circuits do have cases allowing
testimony on direct examination of the truthfulness terms of a plea agreement, however, an
agreement's existence is necessarily admitted.
119. United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 983-84 (7th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).
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sal Rehabilitative Services (PA) v. United States120 resolved the conflict
between two earlier cases decided a year apart, United States v.
Thomas, 12 ' and United States v. Gaev.122 Thomas, in a split 2-1 panel,
reversed the conviction of the defendant because the trial court admitted,
over defense objection, evidence of co-defendant's guilty pleas. The
defense represented that it would not attack the witness's credibility
based on their plea agreements. The court held the admission of the
evidence was not needed to show the witnesses's credibility because the
defense represented that it would not attack on cross-examination the
witness's credibility based on the plea agreements.
123
The government argued that the evidence was necessary to ensure
the jury did not impermissibly conclude that the defendant alone was
being prosecuted. The circuit court reasoned that the district court could
have given an instruction that the jury need only concern themselves
with the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and that information
regarding disposition of others involved in the scheme was not the jury's
concern. 2 4 Lastly, the government argued that the evidence was neces-
sary to establish the witnesses' roles in the unlawful scheme. 25 The
circuit court reasoned, however, that the witnesses themselves testified
as to their involvement. 2 6 Based on these reasons, the Third Circuit
found the district court erred because the evidence of the plea agreement
was admitted for no permissible purpose for which evidence of a guilty
plea of a witness involved in the same underlying criminal activity may
be admitted. 
2 7
The court also could not find the error to be harmless. Despite the
district court giving limiting instructions to the jury to not consider the
witnesses' guilty pleas as evidence of the defendant's guilt, it could not
determine to a high probability that the error did not affect substantial
rights. 128 "[I]t seems plain.., that the lack of proper purpose for admit-
ting the guilty pleas to conspiracy charges is not cured by limiting
instructions. "129 The Thomas court drew a distinction between a guilty
plea being admitted for a substantive crime, which would likely be
admissible with a curative instruction, and a guilty plea for a conspiracy,
120. 205 F.3d 657 (3d Cir. 2000).
121. 998 F.2d 1202 (3d Cir. 1993).
122. 24 F.3d 473 (3d Cir. 1994).




127. Id. at 1206.
128. Id. at 1206-07.
129. Id. at 1206.
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when not admitted for any permissible purpose. 3 '
The next year, a different Third Circuit panel, while not explicitly
overruling Thomas, seemingly limited its effects in United States v.
Gaev.'3 ' In Gaev, an analogous situation to Thomas, the district court
admitted "evidence" of three co-conspirators' plea agreements over
defense objection. Contrary to Thomas, the Gaev panel reasoned that
whenever a co-conspirator testifies he took part in the criminal scheme
in which the defendant is charged:
[h]is credibility will automatically be implicated. Questions will
arise in the minds of jurors whether the co-conspirator is being prose-
cuted, why he is testifying, and what he may be getting in return. If
jurors know the terms of the plea agreement, these questions will be
set to rest and they will be able to evaluate the declarant's motives
and credibility.' 32
Note the difference between these two conspiracy cases. In
Thomas, the Third Circuit found that the agreement was admissible for
no permissible purpose. Instructions could be issued to dispel jurors'
notions of selective prosecution. The defense in Thomas was allowed to
stipulate its way out of the admissibility of the plea agreement by not
attacking credibility based on the agreement, whereas in Gaev, credibil-
ity was "automatically" at issue. The Gaev court further distinguished
Thomas on the basis that in Thomas, there was no direct evidence of
Thomas's criminal intent. On the other hand, in Gaev, co-conspirators
gave direct testimony as to the defendant's criminal activity and intent.
The cases are distinguishable only on the facts. Decided by differ-
ent Third Circuit panels, the assertions the Thomas court made that it
could have dispelled jury concerns with a cautionary instruction over a
guilty plea to conspiracy, directly conflicted with the Gaev court's opin-
ion. It did not take long for the Third Circuit to ease its restrictions
against admitting evidence of plea agreements on direct examination,
prior to any attack on witness credibility. In 2000, during an en banc
rehearing, the Third Circuit in United States v. Universal Rehabilitative
Services (PA), agreed and overruled Thomas. The court adopted, inter
alia, the dissenting opinion in Thomas, along with the Gaev opinion, as
accurately reflecting the law within the Third Circuit. 33
130. Id.
131. 24 F.3d 473 (3d Cir. 1994).
132. Id. at 477.
133. 205 F.3d 657, 669-70 (3d Cir. 2000).
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2. ADMISSIBILITY OF THE TRUTHFULNESS PROVISION OF A
PLEA AGREEMENT
The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Magee, and the Tenth Cir-
cuit, in United States v. Lord,'34 held not only that the existence of the
agreement should be admitted on direct examination, but also that the
truthfulness terms of the agreement should also be admitted. 135 In
Magee, during its opening statement, the government described the
requirement for its intended witnesses to testify truthfully under their
respective plea agreements. 136 Part of the assigned error assailed by the
defendant concerned two government witnesses' testimony. During the
witnesses' testimony, the prosecutor had one witness read the provisions
requiring truthful testimony, and asked them both clarifying questions to
demonstrate their knowledge of those provisions:
37
Prosecutor: What occurs in the event that you do not tell the truth
here today?
Witness #1: 1 would be in violation of the agreement. The agree-
ment wouldn't be any good, I guess.
Prosecutor: Do you understand, in accordance with the plea agree-
ment, that if the government catches you lying, the plea agreement is
off?
Witness #1: Yes.
Prosecutor: [I]f you are found to be telling a lie to this jury, what do
you expect is going to happen to your plea agreement?
Witness #2: It would probably be revoked.
138
The court evaluated the reading and associated questions with an
eye towards: (1) whether it would lead a jury to believe that the govern-
ment knew something about the witness's veracity outside of the infor-
mation available to the jury; 39 (2) whether the prosecution implied that
it independently verified the witness's testimony; and (3) whether the
questions and reading gave the prosecutor's implied personal opinion on
the witness's veracity. In all three contexts, the court concluded the
prosecution did not and rejected the appeal.
140
134. 907 F.2d 1028, 1030-31 (10th Cir. 1990).




139. Id.; see United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 386-87 (8th Cir. 1991). Leading the
jury to believe that the government had information regarding a witness's veracity outside the
information available to the jury is discussed in Part II.B.3.ii. infra.
140. Magee, 19 F.3d at 421. These contexts considered by the court are the most prominent
reasons that agreements or witness testimony are appealed. The Eight Circuit has also ruled that
eliciting evidence showing the lack of a plea or immunity agreement is not impermissible
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The Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits will not allow eliciting
the truth-telling provisions of a plea agreement until the witness's credi-
bility is attacked. 41 In United States v. Maniego, decided by the Second
Circuit, the defendant appealed because, among other grounds, the testi-
fying government witnesses stated on direct examination that they
would receive immunity if they told the truth. 142 Citing Federal Rule of
Evidence 608(a)(2), the court stated that co-defendant's counsel had
attacked the witness's credibility in her opening statement, thus opening
the door to the rehabilitating testimony. 143  The Eleventh Circuit, in
United States v. Cruz,' 44 adopted this same rule, citing the 1985 Second
Circuit case, United States v. Smith,'4 5 which relied on Maniego.
In 1991, an analysis by the Ninth Circuit questioned the basis for
these two circuit courts' reliance on Rule 608(a)(2). 146 The purpose of
Rule 608(a)(2) is to encourage direct attacks on a witness's veracity and
to discourage indirect attacks on a witness, for example, through attacks
on her general character for truthfulness. 147 Thus, Rule 608(a)(2) would
not allow rehabilitation by character evidence of truthfulness after a
direct attack on a witness's veracity for bias. 148 "For example, it would
vouching for the witness when the defendant implies an agreement exists. United States v.
Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1450 (8th Cir. 1996); Jenner v. Class, 79 F.3d 736, 739 (8th Cir. 1996).
Here, the introduction of a letter from the Department of Justice indicating a witness was not
receiving any benefit in return for her truthful testimony did not constitute impermissible
vouching on the witness's despite placing the prestige of the government behind the witness.
Jenner, 79 F.3d at 739. In fact, the government did not even comment on the witness's veracity.
141. See synoptic chart in Part VI infra; accord United States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429, 433
(9th Cir. 1983); Smith v. United States, 687 A.2d 1356, 1367 (D.C. 1996); People v. Lukity, 596
N.W.2d 607, 610 (Mich. 1999).
142. 710 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1983).
143. Id. (emphasis in original); see United States v. Jones, 763 F.2d 518, 522 (2d Cir. 1985)
(stating that despite rule against eliciting truth-telling provisions as expressed in United States v.
Arroyo-Angulo, 580 F.2d 1137, 1146 (2d Cir. 1978), defense counsel attacked the credibility of
witness in opening statement, and thus could not be heard to complain at the witness's
rehabilitation on direct examination).
144. 805 F.2d 1464, 1480 (11th Cir. 1986).
145. 778 F.2d 925, 928 (2d Cir. 1985).
146. See United States v. Dring, 930 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1991).
147. The Dring court stated:
Character evidence in support of credibility is admissible under the rule only after
the witness' character has first been attacked, as has been the case at common law.
The enormous needless consumption of time which a contrary practice would entail
justifies the limitation. Opinion or reputation that the witness is untruthful
specifically qualifies as an attack under the rule, and evidence or misconduct,
including conviction of crime, and of corruption also fall within this category.
Evidence of bias or interest does not.
Id. at 690-91 n.2 (citing FED. R. Evio. 608(a) advisory committee notes) (other citations omitted)
(emphasis added). If credibility were attacked based on a plea agreement, a sound argument may
be raised that the defendant's entering into such an agreement is evincing of his interest, and thus
may not be rehabilitated under Rule 608(a).
148. Id. at 691.
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be permissible to imply that, because of bias due to a family relation-
ship, a father is lying to protect his son."' 4 9 "Such evidence directly
undermines the veracity and credibility of the witness in the instant case,
without implicating the witness as a liar in general."' 50 Rule 608(a)(2)
does, however, allow rehabilitation after indirect attacks on a witness's
general character for truthfulness by permitting opinion or reputation
evidence which would allow a jury to infer that a witness was lying at
present because he or she lied in the past.' 5' Additionally, the rule
requires an attack "by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation."'' 5 2
A statement made in opening statement is not in evidence.
The Second Circuit's reasoning in Maniego notes simply that credi-
bility testimony may not be elicited until an attack. Maniego does not
explain how the government's witnesses were attacked, noting merely
that the co-defendant's counsel joined the credibility issue in opening
argument. 153 If the nature of the attack was direct, as to the instant case,
then the court's reliance on Rule 608(a)(2) is misplaced, and the witness
may not be rehabilitated. If the attack was indirect and more genera-
lized, then rehabilitation under Rule 608(a)(2) would be allowed, but
only by opinion or reputation evidence.
What happened in Maniego may be reasoned more appropriately by
analogy to Rule 608(b). Rule 608(b) states in relevant part: "[s]pecific
instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of ... supporting
the witness' credibility .. . .may . . . in the discretion of the court, if
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness ...concerning the witness' character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness."'' 54 By questioning the witness about the
terms of the agreement, the prosecution was eliciting a specific instance
of conduct regarding why the witness would be more likely to tell the
truth in the instant case, i.e., because there is a grant of immunity (or in
other cases, a plea agreement). Admission of this evidence on direct
examination would be necessary to counter the attack made on the
defense's opening statement. Where there is no guarantee that the
defense would cross-examine the witness, the prosecution would other-
wise be left in a position where she could not otherwise have an oppor-




152. FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
153. United States v. Mangiego, 710 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1983).
154. FED. R. EvID. 608(b).
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3. DON'T KICK A DEAD HORSE
While the requirement of the truthful testimony in a plea agreement
is admissible, too many utterances may be a problem on appeal. By
allowing disproportionate emphasis, a prosecutor may cross the fine line
between introducing the agreement as evidence of the witness's credibil-
ity and introducing it for some prohibited use.'55 This issue came up
recently in the Seventh Circuit case United States v. Collins.'56 In Col-
lins, the government introduced into evidence, over defense objection,
evidence regarding cooperation and plea agreements for ten government
witnesses. 57 The court noted that the district court should not permit
the government to make "unnecessarily repetitive references to
truthfulness."' 58
The Seventh Circuit also noted that in a case that came on appeal
after the Collins's trial, United States v. Thornton,'59 there were even
more numerous references to truthfulness than the plea agreements in
the instant case, and the court in that case held it was not an abuse of
discretion to enter the agreements into evidence. 60 In Thornton, nine
witnesses' plea agreements were entered into evidence, along with prof-
fer letters. 161 Each agreement contained five references to requirements
for truthful testimony, and the proffer letters each contained three refer-
ences to those requirements.1 62 As in Thornton, the district court in Col-
lins gave cautionary jury instructions that directed the jury to consider
the government witness with "caution and great care."' 163 The Thornton
court, however, chastised prosecutors "for coming perilously close to
being unnecessarily repetitive" and that they should "think twice before
risking reversal."' 164  The court stated that the proffer letters were
overkill, and that they added no value beyond the plea agreements. 65
B. Admissibility of Witness's Understanding of the Plea Agreement
All but the District of Columbia, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits (the latter two not yet having the opportunity to address the issue),
are in agreement that the witness's "understanding" of his plea agree-
155. United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 899 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Henderson,
717 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1981).
156. 223 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 2000).
157. Id. at 510.
158. Id. (quoting United States v. Lewis, 110 F.3d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1997)).
159. 197 F.3d 241, 252 (7th Cir. 1999).
160. Collins, 223 F.3d at 510.
161. Thornton, 197 F.3d at 251.
162. Id. at 251-52.
163. Id. at 252 n.4.
164. Id. at 252-53.
165. Id. at 252.
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ment is admissible on direct examination.' 66 The Ninth, Tenth, and Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuits have not directly addressed the issue of
admissibility of a witness's understanding of a plea agreement on direct
examination, but have ruled that the "terms" of an agreement are admis-
sible. 167 If received from a beneficiary-witness, this could be couched in
terms of the witness's "understanding." Thus, these circuits would
likely allow a witness's "understanding" to be admitted on direct
examination.
In United States v. Winter, the First Circuit allowed testimony on a
witness's understanding of an oral immunity agreement.'68 Addition-
ally, because the government revealed the arrangements of the immunity
deal to the defendant before trial,169 and the witness reiterated the terms
while on the stand, the court ruled that the defendant's assigned errors
regarding the infringement of his rights to confrontation and due process
were groundless. 171
In the Seventh Circuit case United States v. Mealy, the defendants
claimed error by the trial court because the prosecutor improperly
vouched for the witnesses by: (1) implying he possessed information not
heard by the jury on the immunized witness's veracity; or (2) expressing
or implying that the witness is telling the truth. The court ruled that the
prosecutor did neither, but rather merely asked the witness questions on
his understanding of the plea agreement.'1
7
In United States v. Craig,172 another Seventh Circuit case, the
defendants argued that questions and answers concerning the immunized
166. See synoptic table infra Part VI.
167. See synoptic table infra Part VI. The Ninth Circuit has addressed the question of
elicitation of a witness's understanding of his obligations under a plea agreement in an unreported
opinion and ruled that this did not constitute vouching. United States v. Coronel, No. 92-50317,
1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 6111, at *3 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 1994).
168. 663 F.2d 1120 (1st Cir. 1981).
169. The case does not specify the mechanism by which this was done.
170. Winter, 663 F.2d at 1133-34.
171. United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 900 (7th Cir. 1988). There was also an assigned
error that the prosecutor improperly bolstered the witnesses by needless references to truthful
testimony in the agreements themselves. Each agreement, and here the trial court dealt with five
of them, contained four or five references each to a requirement to give truthful testimony. The
court said the "government should avoid unnecessarily repetitive references to truthfulness if it
wished to introduce the agreements into evidence." Id. at 899. Nevertheless, the court did not
believe that the promise of truthful testimony was disproportionately emphasized or repeated. Id.
at 899-900. Not much information was apparent as to how little (or how much) emphasis was
given. All that was mentioned as far as highlighting any facet of the agreements, and incidentally
this was in the portion of the opinion analyzing alleged improper vouching, as opposed to
bolstering, was the prosecutor's asking the witnesses to state their understanding of the plea
agreements they entered into with the government and two other statements that the court
dismissed as not errors. Id. at 900.
172. 573 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1978).
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witness's understanding of the immunization agreement conveyed to the
jury the impression that the prosecutor was in a position to personally
know whether or not a witness was truthful. Therefore, the jury was
given the appearance of a witness whose veracity is vouched for by the
government. The witness explained her understanding of her immunity
agreement to be "my testimony that I will give will not be held against
me as long as I tell the truth."1 73 The court found nothing improper
about the question of the witness's understanding of the terms in the
immunity order. In Craig, the Seventh Circuit found no insinuation by
the prosecutor, direct or otherwise, that the government possessed
knowledge unknown to the jury on the issue of the immunized witness's
veracity. 174 Further, the court stated that the jury's function of assessing
credibility and weighing testimony was "aided by evidence of an immu-
nized witness's understanding of the terms under which he or she is
testifying."'' 75  As stated by the Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Creamer, relied on in Craig, by questioning a witness over his or her
understanding of a plea agreement, the government is presenting the
pressures the witness was testifying under and what would happen if he
breached the agreement. 76 Further, the government is neither present-
ing information not available to the jury nor is the government giving a
personal opinion regarding the witness's veracity.
177
At this point, one should see that prosecutors may establish the
existence, terms, and understanding (but keeping in mind that the Elev-
enth Circuit has yet to specifically consider admissibility of either the
"terms" or "understanding") of a plea agreement on direct examination
without having it considered inadmissibly bolstering or vouching.
78
This makes sense if one considers that the plea agreement is a double-
edged sword, making apparent the witness's bias and interest in present-
ing testimony in a believable fashion, regardless of the truth. 179 The
173. Id. at 519.
174. See United States v. Creamer, 555 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1977).
175. Craig, 573 F.2d at 519.
176. Creamer, 555 F.2d at 617.
177. See id. at 617-18.
178. See United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1449-50 (8th Cir. 1996). But see State v.
Eby, 673 P.2d 522 (Or. 1993) (evidence concerning the terms of a plea agreement held not
relevant because it does not tend to prove or disprove credibility).
179. United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 899 (7th Cir. 1988); see United States v. Werme,
939 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1990). Werme explained that rationale behind admitting agreements:
The most frequent purpose for introducing such evidence is to bring to the jury's
attention facts bearing upon a witness's credibility. Proof that a witness has pleaded
guilty or has agreed to plead guilty is highly relevant to show bias, a recognized
mode of impeachment. The term "bias" is used "to describe the relationship
between a party [in this case the prosecution] and a witness which might lead the
witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a
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other edge of the sword aids the government by showing to the jury a
witness's interest in providing truthful testimony 8 ° or how the witness
has knowledge of the crime. 8'
C. Admissibility of the Entire Plea Agreement
The circuits are split as to when a plea agreement may properly be
admitted. Six circuits, namely, the First,'82 Third' 83 , Fourth,' 84 Sixth,'85
and Seventh, 186 and Eighth 87 have admitted them in direct examination.
The Second Circuit allows the entire plea agreement to be admitted if
credibility is attacked in opening argument, but with the caveat that Rule
403 may require some redaction to eliminate prejudicial, confusing, or
misleading information.' 88 The Fifth Circuit has endorsed the use of
"plea agreement letters" that memorializes the respective promises of
the government and witness.' 89 The Ninth Circuit has not addressed
admitting the entire agreement on direct examination. The Tenth Circuit
has not addressed the question. Lastly, the District of Columbia Circuit
has ruled that allowing a witness to provide testimony on direct exami-
nation about "the terms" of his cooperation agreement with the govern-
ment is not error, let alone plain error. 90
This seems to fly in the face of the rule against improper bolstering
of a witness. Again, evidence of a plea agreement cuts both ways. Its
introduction shows the witness's interest in the case-he is getting
something in return for the testimony he is giving. Additionally, a cura-
tive instruction should be given as to the limited admissibility of the
party." A witness who has pleaded guilty may have a tendency to favor the
prosecution because of concern about the prosecution's position regarding sentence
or for other reasons. "Proof of bias is almost always relevant" and, unlike "less
favored forms of impeachment," may be shown by "extrinsic evidence." Moreover,
under Fed. R. Evid. 607, a witness may be impeached by any party, "including the
party calling the witness." . . . In any criminal trial, the credibility of the
prosecution's witnesses is central. By eliciting the witness' guilty plea on direct
examination, the government dampens attacks on credibility, and forecloses any
suggestion that it was concealing evidence. Such disclosure is appropriate.
Werme, 939 F.2d at 114 (citations omitted).
180. Mealy, 851 F.2d at 899.
181. United States v. Henderson, 717 F.2d 135, 137 (4th Cir. 1983).
182. United States v. McNeill, 728 F.2d 5, 14 (1st Cir. 1984).
183. United States v. Universal Rehab. Serv. (PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).
184. Henderson, 717 F.2d at 138.
185. United States v. Townsend, 796 F.2d 158, 163 (6th Cir. 1986).
186. United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988). In fact, the Seventh Circuit has
ruled that any error in admitting plea agreements into evidence is harmless in the face of
overwhelming evidence. United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1986).
187. United States v. Drews, 877 F.2d 10, 12 (8th Cir. 1989).
188. United States v. Cosentino, 844 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1988).
189. United States v. Leslie, 759 F.2d 366, 376 (5th Cir. 1985).
190. United States v. Spriggs, 996 F.2d 320, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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witness's guilty plea, i.e., it may not be used to show the guilt of the
accused. Recall the curative instruction was missing in the Third Circuit
Thomas case discussed supra. Also in Thomas, there was no defense
objection. In the Eight Circuit, however, a missing curative instruction,
with no defense objection, is not dispositive in the face of overwhelming
evidence. 191
In the Third Circuit case United States v. Universal Rehabilitation
Services (PA), the co-defendants raised an issue in error regarding the
admissibility of uncharged co-conspirators' plea agreements. 92 The
charged co-defendants stated in a motion-in-limine that they would not
attack the uncharged co-conspirators' credibility. They argued that the
district court erred in admitting evidence regarding the uncharged co-
conspirators' plea agreements. The circuit court used it as an opportu-
nity to resolve the conflict in that court's jurisprudence between United
States v. Gaev and United States v. Thomas, discussed in this Com-
ment. 93 In resolving the case, the Third Circuit stated in a footnote that
for the purposes of their analysis, which was based on Rule 403, admis-
sion of the co-defendants' guilty pleas and plea agreements into evi-
dence are treated equally. 94
The appellants in Universal relied on Old Chief v. United States.
195
In Old Chief, the defendant was charged, inter alia, with possession of a
firearm as a previously convicted felon. One of the elements for that
crime is that the accused was previously found guilty of a felony. Defen-
dant Old Chief argued that allowing the prosecution to introduce into
evidence the actual name of his previous felony conviction would be
unfairly prejudicial to him. 96 The jury may use that name of the charge
for a purpose other than that for which it was intended, i.e., the simple
fact that Old Chief had been previously found guilty of one of the
felonies.
Old Chief offered to stipulate that he had, in fact, been previously
found guilty of a felony. The prosecution turned down that stipulation,
and the trial court allowed this, arguing that the prosecution should have
the opportunity to prove its case the way it deems appropriate."9 The
Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit erred when they reversed
the case because of the state's introduction of the record which included
191. Gerberding v. United States, 471 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1973).
192. 205 F.3d 657 (3d Cir. 2000).
193. See infra Part IV.A.1.
194. Universal, 205 F.3d at 665 n.10.
195. 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
196. Id. at 175.
197. Id. at 177.
2001]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the name of the previously charged felony. 98 One may be tempted to
broaden the meaning of Old Chief to be when two items of evidence,
equally probative, are available to the trial court, the court should use the
least prejudicial. According to Old Chief, the holding is narrower.
"Given these peculiarities of the element of felony-convict status and of
admissions and the like when used to prove it, there is no cognizable
difference between the evidentiary significance of an admission and of
the legitimately probative component of the official record the prosecu-
tion would prefer to place in evidence."' 199
Turning back to Universal, the co-defendants argued that they, sim-
ilar to the defendant in Old Chief, presented the district court, "with an
alternative that lacked the prejudicial effect of the government's prof-
fered evidence-a representation that they would refrain from any
affirmative challenge to the credibility of either [of the uncharged co-
conspirators]. '" 0 In its seven to five decision, the Third Circuit rea-
soned that this alternative, however, presented the district court with a
different situation than the one in Old Chief because the stipulation in
Old Chief went to an element of the crime.20'
First, the Universal co-defendants simply offered not to render any
affirmative challenge to the uncharged co-conspirators' credibility. 02
Second, and more importantly, the Supreme Court's holding in Old
Chief was expressly premised on the Court's belief that the defense offer
to stipulate to the prior conviction and the government's offer to intro-
duce evidence of the same were equally probative.20 3 In the Universal
appeal, however, the co-defendant's offer to refrain from affirmatively
challenging the uncharged co-conspirators' credibility did not, and could
not, carry the same probative value on the issue of witness credibility as
the introduction of the latter's guilty pleas." ° The Third Circuit
declared that its reasoning behind this applies equally to plea
agreements.20 5
Admitting the entire plea agreement has bolstering and impeaching
aspects; recall the two edged sword analogy as discussed in Part IV.B.
The existence of a plea agreement on one hand supports a witness's
credibility by showing his or her interest in testifying truthfully. On the
other hand, the plea agreement may also impeach the witness's credibil-
198. Id. at 179.
199. 519 U.S. at 191.
200. Universal, 205 F.3d at 667.
201. Id. at 666-67.
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ity by showing his or her interest in testifying as the government wishes
regardless of the truth. Introduction of the entire plea agreement permits
the jury to consider fully the possible conflicting motivations underlying
the witness's testimony and, thus, enables the jury to more accurately
assess the witness's credibility.2 °6
V. A HYPOTHETICAL APPLICATION
20 7
Consider the following hypothetical. John, Bob, Stewart, Harry,
and Sam are members of a drug distribution conspiracy. Sam is arrested
in possession of a large amount of heroin. He desires to enter into a plea
agreement with the United States Attorney's Office. Sam's lawyer
approaches the prosecutor to express his desire to enter into plea negoti-
ations, offering information that the government may be interested to
use against John, Bob, Stewart, and Harry. Negotiations at this point
would come under the purview of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(6) in that discussions and statements made in the course of the nego-
tiations would not be admissible against the prospective witness if the
negotiations broke down. So how should the other defendants counter
Sam's turning state's evidence?
First, the defense lawyer should not mention the credibility of Sam
in her opening. To do so would allow the government to get the maxi-
mum amount of information regarding Sam's plea agreement admitted
in its case-in-chief. Assuming the defense counsel does not mention the
agreement, in the government's case-in-chief, the prosecution may elicit
information that Sam is testifying pursuant to a signed (or oral) plea
agreement. The prosecution may have Sam identify the agreement and
testify as to his understanding of the plea agreement. Consider the fol-
lowing colloquy regarding Sam's understanding of the plea agreement:
PROSECUTOR: Sam, tell the court your understanding of the terms of
the agreement.
SAM: I would receive favorable treatment if I testified for the
government.
PROSECUTOR: Favorable treatment in what way?
SAM: The government would (consider) asking the court for a lower
sentence in my case.
PROSECUTOR: Anything else?
SAM: I had to provide information about what I knew about the (con-
spiracy) (scheme) to investigators.
So long as the prosecutor does not elicit that Sam's agreement is
206. United States v. Drews, 877 F.2d 10, 12 (8th Cir. 1989).
207. See generally William B. Johnson, Annotation, Use of Plea Bargain or Grant of Immunity
as Improper Vouching for Credibility of Witness in Federal Cases, 76 A.L.R. FED. 409 (2000).
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revocable if he should perjure himself and that he would be liable for all
crimes committed and information used to impeach him at a later trial,
the above colloquy would be acceptable.2"8 Addressing these issues
have been considered as bolstering to the prosecution case. Thus, to
properly adhere to the "regime" of plea agreement admissibility, this
information should not be elicited until attacked. Unless, of course, one
is in one of the more permissive circuits.
While the government is conducting its direct examination, defense
counsel should be alert for instances of improper vouching, raise an
objection, and request a curative instruction pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 105. If on cross-examination, the defense counsel raises the
plea agreement as a credibility issue, then the government may introduce
the plea agreement itself on redirect. Defense counsel may consider not
making the plea agreement a character issue, and instead directly
impeach the witness as towards bias. °9
Prosecutors may want the direct attack for bias because the argu-
ment would be stronger to admit the plea agreement into evidence.
Defense counsel not wanting to have a plea agreement admitted may
want to impeach the witness indirectly by opinion or reputation evi-
dence. This argument is based on the idea that the witness may be reha-
bilitated with specific instances of conduct, which may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence. Thus, the plea agreement may not be admitted.
Defense counsel will want to request a limiting instruction upon the wit-
ness's testimony to highlight the fact that the testifying witness pled
guilty should not be used by the jury as substantive evidence of the
defendant's guilt. If there arises an occasion to admit the plea agree-
ment, prosecutors should be wary of needless repetition of the require-
ments for truthful testimony.
On closing argument, prosecutors should not argue their personal
opinion as to witness veracity, evidence not in front of the jury, or act as
a personal guarantor of the witness's veracity. Defense counsel should
be attentive for such instances and object and request a limiting instruc-
tion if they should arise. If the reference is " brief and non-recurring," it
is likely any error will be deemed harmless on appeal.210 Defense coun-
sel should be aware that failure to object will make any error analyzed
on appeal for plain error, an appreciably higher standard than the abuse
of discretion standard, usually employed for evidentiary rulings.
Defense attorneys may consider moving to strike the prosecutor's
remarks. If striking the remarks will not adequately cure the effect of
208. See United States v. Edwards, 631 F.2d 1049, 1052 (2d Cir. 1980).
209. United States v. Dring, 930 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1991).
210. United States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d 1007, 1017 n.7 (9th Cir. 1991).
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the statements, the defense attorney should request an instruction to the
effect that the plea agreement promise to tell the truth adds little to the
obligation of a witness to tell the truth under oath, that the prosecutor
often has no way to ascertain whether or not the witness is telling the
truth, that acquittal would not mean that the government would not still
make its promise of leniency for the testifying witness, nor that acquittal
would cause the government to seek an indictment of the witness for
perjury.El'
VI. THE LOOMING OMNIPRESENCE OF A PLEA OR IMMUNITY
AGREEMENT AGAINST THE ACCUSED
Consider Chart (1), highlighting the law on plea agreements among
the circuit courts of appeal:
211. United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 536 (9th Cir. 1980).
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As evidenced by the chart, a defendant hoping to exclude evidence
from a witness testifying pursuant to a plea agreement faces a steep
uphill climb. Few cases have been reversed due to a prosecutor improp-
erly vouching.22°
The Second, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits may be the last
hold outs to total open admissibility of any facet of a plea agreement,
leaving only a cautionary instruction as a barrier between the defendant
and the damage a beneficiary-witness's plea agreement can do. The
most stringent, the Second Circuit, lamented in 1988 that, were it writ-
ing on a blank slate, it may have followed the majority of circuits and
not caused parties in the heat of trial to discern between niceties of what
information was bolstering and what was impeaching.22'
The Ninth Circuit's guidance starting in 1980 with United States v.
Roberts,222 and extending through four other cases decided in 1988 and
1989, provide sound guidance in handling plea agreements.223 Consider
the Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Wallace. In Wallace, the
court reasoned that a witness who signed a plea agreement and referred
to the agreement on direct examination may be an error, either individu-
ally or cumulatively with two other possible errors cited by the Ninth
Circuit.2 24 The case was remanded to determine whether any of the
three errors constituted reversible error on one of the two defendants'
convictions.225 Wallace is reconcilable with Roberts, decided eight
years prior, because Roberts requires a determination by the judge to
issue a cautionary instruction before admitting a plea agreement. No
such instruction was given in Wallace. 26
The Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Hedman may
offer protection of an unjustly accused against a witness who had signed
a plea agreement. 2 7 Under Hedman, truthfulness terms of an agreement
will be admitted unless there is some additional implication that the gov-
ernment possessed special knowledge of the witness's veracity. 228 But
what does this really mean? It sounds like the plea agreement terms will
not be admitted if the government is vouching for the witness. The
220. See supra Part III.B.2.i.
221. United States v. Cosentino, 844 F.2d 30, 33 n.1 (2d Cir. 1988).
222. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530.
223. United States v. Lew, 875 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105
(9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Portac, 869 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Wallace,
848 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1988).
224. 848 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1988).
225. See id. at 1473-74.
226. Id. at 1476.
227. 630 F.2d 1184, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1980).
228. See id. at 1198.
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prohibitions against vouching already exist, and by now prosecutors are
surely aware of the limitation. Hedman is protection without function.
Substantive information regarding a plea agreement is going to be
admitted. Consider the Eight Circuit's opinion in United States v.
Drews,229 which expanded earlier Eighth Circuit decisions United States
v. Hutchings23 ° and United States v. Braidlow23' as reasoning to admit
the written text of the plea agreements. Drews used those cases for the
proposition that a confederate's plea or plea agreement is admissible on
direct examination of the government's witness as evidence of his credi-
bility and acknowledgment of his participation in the offense.232 Hutch-
ings, however, addressed the admissibility of a confederate's plea, while
Braidlow addressed admissibility of confederates' "pleas and plea
arrangements" on direct examination. Yet, in neither of those two cases
was the physical plea agreement at issue. This extension is demonstra-
tive of the lack of real substance between, on one hand a confederate's
oral testimony of the "arrangements" or the "terms" to show the wit-
ness's "understanding" of a play agreement and the admission of the
written plea agreement.
VII. CONCLUSION
Put the issue with plea agreements in terms of what a jury is hear-
ing. Can there be that much of a difference if a jury hears the terms of a
plea agreement, (or the witness's "understanding" of the agreement),
and if the jury does not get a chance to actually see the agreement in the
jury room? The damage to the defendant is done. It will likely be last-
ing, despite any appropriate cautionary instruction.
Even in the more stringent circuits, such as the Second, Ninth, and
Eleventh, the only way information surrounding a plea agreement could
possibly not be admitted is when the defense chooses not to attack the
witness's credibility, an unlikely tactic given the damaging testimony
from the government's witnesses. The march towards admissibility of
just about all facets of a plea agreement began with the defense arguing
that eliciting plea agreements constituted impermissible vouching or
bolstering. It evolved to the point where to get the best deal, an accused
better turn state's evidence early if involved in a criminal transaction
with others. If there is a lone criminal, he best admit responsibility early
in order to save himself from the harsher sentences allowed under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
229. 877 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1989).
230. 751 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1984).
231. 806 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1986).
232. United States v. Drews, 877 F.2d 10, 12 (8th Cir. 1989).
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Despite the restriction against using a witness's guilt in a criminal
transaction as evidenced in a plea agreement as propensity evidence that
the accused is also guilty, one cannot help but wonder how effective that
restriction will be. Consider a typical witness's testimony. It would
likely consist of his presence at the scene, information on the planning
of the crime, and testimony on the accused's role. Indeed, one of the
only tactics available to a defense attorney is to attack with both barrels
at the witness's credibility and highlight the quid pro quo for the wit-
ness's testimony and other assistance in the case.
Indeed, the devastating effect of a witness testifying against an
accused pursuant to a plea agreement, combined with the Old Chief ver-
biage allowing the prosecutor to "weave his tale" to effectuate his case,
allows the prosecutor much leeway, with little room for prosecutorial
accountability.233 Criminal trials have become criminal processes when
a plea agreement is involved. On the surface this may not necessarily be
a bad thing, but it goes far in effecting judicial efficiency. A defendant
signing a plea agreement in return for a recommendation from the prose-
cutor for sentencing at the low end of an offense level is not necessarily
getting much. For example, for an offense level of twenty-two, the
range is forty-one to fifty-one months; the difference in this case may at
most be a difference of ten months jail time.234 Regardless, this misses
the point: a defendant who enters into the plea agreement relatively early
into an investigation may be able to plead to a lesser number or type of
crime in exchange for his testimony, thus lessening his culpability. Con-
sidering the motivation one has to tell the court what the government
wants to hear, this would result in gross injustice towards the unjustly
accused, as this testimony will be truly insurmountable by any
defendant.
JAMES D. CARLSON*
233. See generally Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away
Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939 (1997).
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